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REGULATION OF THE OUTER SPACE
ENVIRONMENT THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL ACCORD: THE 1979
MOON TREATY
INTRODUCTION
Outer space has always fascinated mankind. Access to outer space has
immense potential for material benefits,' including industrial, military,
and scientific advancement. 2 Outer space is the evolving frontier of an
evolving society.3 Government and private space activities, including
preparation and follow-up, "have grown immensely in recent years in
volume and diversity,"4 and space exploration is only in the embryonic
stage.5 The impending transformation of outer space will require redefi-
nition of the rights and responsibilities of citizens and governments alike
in the development of this near virgin environment.6
Since 1967, the world has attempted to meet this challenge7 through a
series of international treaties and agreements.' The most recent pact,
"The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies," 9 addresses not only the exploration of the
Moon, but exploration of all celestial bodies within our solar system.' 0 It
sets forth specific aims and guidelines in an attempt to achieve equitable,
1. K. BOCKSTIEGEL SPACE LAW: CHANGES AND EXPECTATIONS AT THE TURN
TO COMMERCIAL SPACE ACTIVITIES, 8 Forum Internationale 3 (1986).
2. See N. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW 3-23 (1988).
3. Id. at 3.
4. 1 SPACE LAW: BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS at xiii (K. Bockstiegel & M. Benko
ed. 1990).
5. N. Goldman, American Space Law 186 (1988).
6. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
7. Although a number of accords dealt with various facets of air and space travel,
the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done on Jan. 27,
1967, [hereinafter cited as the Space Treaty] was the first major international accord in
the area of space law promulgated by the United Nations.
8. The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, done on Dec. 5, 1979, is the fifth international accord on space law chartered
by the United Nations. The others are the Space Treaty, the Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, done on Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, the
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, done on
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, and the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, done on Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No.
8480. The Moon Treaty appears in full in the Appendix to this Note.
9. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, done on Dec. 18, 1979, xvii I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter cited as the Moon Treaty].
10. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY,
96th CONG., 2nd SESs., S262-9 AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES
ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, at vii-vin (Comm. Print 1980) [herein-
after cited as Comm. Print].
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cooperative, and harmonious exploration and development in space
among terrestrial states."
The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space
(UNCOPUOS)' 2 had constructed four major space law international
treaties prior to the Moon Treaty. 3 Each of these treaties took signifi-
cant steps towards establishing a working guide for conduct and respon-
sibility of states venturing into space. There is a continuing question of
whether the Moon Treaty makes important inroads in comparison to
other treaties, or is merely a compilation of treaties past. An additional
question is whether it adequately addresses areas that have caused the
greatest concern and confusion."' While it would be impossible to fore-
see all matters in space that will require new legal treatment, the law
should seek to solve those problems and correct omissions that have al-
ready been identified and need to be addressed. 5
This Note examines the value and effectiveness of the Moon Treaty in
comparison with space treaties that have preceded it. Part I of this Note
looks at some of the objectives offered as reasons for development of the
Moon Treaty and discusses the underlying purposes that prompted its
creation. Part II of the Note highlights both positive and negative parts
of the treaty and provides an overview of the substance of several articles.
Part III discusses the potential effectiveness of the Moon Treaty and its
additions to existing accords on space law. The Note concludes by argu-
ing that although the Moon Treaty introduces a few potentially valuable
concepts, it fails to make a significant contribution to the existing law
and should therefore not be ratified by the majority of COPUOS States.
I. STATED OBJECTIVES AND THE UNDERLYING PURPOSE IN
DEVELOPING THE MOON TREATY
A. Stated Objectives
Since ratification of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967,16 the main objec-
11. See id. In international space law the term "state" refers to a terrestrial nation or
sovereignty.
12. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space is commonly
called UNCOPUOS or COPUOS. Created in 1958, COPUOS is the United Nations
committee responsible for investigating and promulgating international space law. The
committee currently has fifty-three member countries. COPUOS approves proposed
treaties by a concensus vote. After clearing COPUOS, a treaty must then be voted on
and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The document is then
submitted to the States (countries) for ratification. Each treaty indicates the number of
nations necessary to ratify the document for it to become binding on the nations that
ratified it.
13. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
14. Van Traa-Engelman, The Moon Treaty: Legal Consequences and Practical As-
pects, 23 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE PROC., 73 (1980). See also E.
vAN BOGAERT, ASPECTS OF SPACE LAW 94 (1986).
15. Although there were specific reasons given for promulgation of the Moon Treaty,
this Note discusses the more likely motivations behind the reasons.
16. The Outer Space Treaty has been signed by almost one hundred nations since its
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tive of subsequent treaties has been to meet problems that have since
developed.1 7 Just as "[I]aw changes to reflect other changes in our soci-
ety," Is space law "continues to expand and change as the activities that it
oversees expand and change."'" As activity in space has increased,20 in-
ternational space law has become more complex, thus escalating diffi-
culty in reaching accords on international space treaties.2
The primary stated objective of the 1979 Moon Treaty is to provide
the necessary legal principles for governing the behavior of states, inter-
national organizations, and individuals who explore celestial bodies other
than Earth, as well as administration of the resources that exploration
may yield.22 The specifically stated objectives include: enhancement of
opportunities and conditions for evaluation, researchs and exploration of
the natural resources of celestial bodies;2 3 promotion of exchange of sci-
entific results;24 the assurance of exclusively peaceful use of celestial bod-
ies;2  and increased participation in seeking the objectives of earlier
treaties.26
B. Underlying Purposes
The major purpose in development of the Moon Treaty was to assure
developing countries and non-space powers that they would not be ex-
cluded from reaping the resource benefits of space exploration.2 7
ratification. Many of the tenets in the treaty's seventeen articles have been expanded in
later accords, but the treaty remains the backbone of space law today.
17. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY
122 (1989) (quoting Galloway, Issues in Implementing the Agreement Governing the Ac-
tivities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 23 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE PROC. 19, 22 (1980)).
18. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
19. Id. at 185.
20. See generally G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND POLICY 247-305 (1989). In addition to increased exploration and communications
flights by various governments, private parties are launching communications satellites,
and both government and private groups are planning civilian tour flights.
21. Id. at 10-11.
22. Comm. Print, supra note 10, at vii.
23. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY
112 (1989) (quoting Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Interna-
tional Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L. L. 419, 421-26 (1980)). See also C. OKOLIE, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING AND OUTER SPACE 42-43 (1989).
24. Comm. Print, supra note 10, at 316.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 317-18.
27. While the Outer Space Treaty determined that space could not be appropriated,
some parties to the treaty interpreted the restriction as only applying to resources still
imbedded in the celestial bodies. The United States and the Soviet Union both believe
that resources removed from the environment become the property of the party that
removes them. This is an unacceptable theory to many of the non-space powers, because
state parties without space travel capability would never have claims to the resources
found in space. Those states believed that in developing a new Moon Treaty and includ-
ing the phrase "Common Heritage" to describe the outer space environment, they would
have a claim to the celestial resources, regardless of their incapacity for space exploration.
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Although the 1967 Outer Space Treaty had deemed the Moon and other
celestial bodies useable only for peaceful purposes and to be Res Extra
Commercium, 28 many non-space powers wanted to add terminology that
would give them unquestioned rights to the natural resources found in
space.29 The utilization of outer space remained on the agenda of succes-
sive meetings of the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations Outer
Space Committee. The agenda included proposals for a new agreement
concerning the activities on the Moon. Proposals on administration of
resources from the Moon and other celestial bodies continued to be prof-
fered after 1967.30
Dr. Aldo Armando Cocca, a representative of Argentina, a non-space
power, introduced the foundations of the Moon Treaty as a draft.3" The
proposal, presented to COPUOS on July 3, 1970, argued that the Space
Treaty of 1967 was deficient because it did not specifically regulate the
use of the Moon's natural resources.32 The Argentinean proposal had
five articles relating to the use of the Moon's natural resources, the bene-
fits derived from them, and the nature of the laws which should govern
their use.33 In 1971 the Soviet Union proposed a more narrowly drawn
draft as COPUOS prepared to consider an international treaty concern-
ing the Moon.34 The Soviet draft as well as many others were introduced
and failed between 1971 and 1979, when COPUOS adopted the Moon
Treaty. Most of the disagreement centered on the use of the phrase
"Common Heritage of Mankind" (or "Common Heritage") 35 a contro-
versial phrase because it ostensibly would give greater rights to non-
space powers than they previously enjoyed. 36 During that eight year pe-
riod, a myriad of working papers, policy proposals, and draft treaties
28. This phrase, found in Article 2 of the Space Treaty, is latin for "areas legally not
susceptable to national appropriation."
29. Cheng, The Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies Within the Solar System Other Than Earth, 33 CUR-
RENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 213 (1980).
30. Id.
31. Comm. Print, supra note 10, at 7.
32. The preamble of Dr. Cocca's proposal makes this point, but it is not specifically
mentioned in the approved draft of the Moon Treaty. See also, Comm. Print, supra note
10, at 7. At this point in space exploration, Moon dirt and rock samples have been
brought back and undergone basic geological testing. The real concern is the possibility
that someday resources will be brought back that will have significant value of one kind
or another.
33. Id. This draft and others were debated and discussed within COPUOS and even-
tually tabled.
34. Cheng, supra note 29, at 213-215. The Soviet draft concerned only the Moon and
did not discuss its resources or other celestial bodies. These were issues that played sig-
nificant parts in delaying accord on the substance of the Moon Treaty for nine years. By
the time there was a final agreement, the United States had submitted at least 16 of its
own proposals.
35. Id. at 216.
36. Unispace '82, A CONTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMPETI-
TION, A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM, 26 (1983). This phrase was borrowed from the
Law of The Sea Treaty, where it played an integral part in formulation of the treaty.
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were considered within COPUOS in repeated attempts to resolve the dis-
agreement over inclusion of the phrase "Common Heritage."" The con-
tinuing disagreement over the rights of each country to the natural
resources of the Moon illustrates the underlying purpose of the Moon
Treaty: to formally and finally determine the legal status of the celestial
bodies' natural resources. 38 Those entities desiring that the final docu-
ment address this matter constructed rather broad proposals on sharing
celestial body benefits which included those proposals in the eventual
Moon Treaty without ever specifying the proposals' true objectives.3 9
Even the United States, a strong supporter of the "Common Heritage"
theme during negotiations and perhaps, the force behind its eventual in-
clusion in the Moon Treaty, did not envision the eventual ramifications
of adopting this broad theory. Indeed the United States has since re-
versed its position on the Moon Treaty based on the "Common Heri-
tage" theory.' The United States now advocates possessive rights to
proceeds removed from the celestial bodies, under the theory that "Com-
mon Heritage" only applies to the actual space environs themselves and
not the actual resources once they are removed from those environs.4
A second underlying purpose for the Moon Treaty was to regulate
activity of states and entities in outer space through a general legal or-
der. 2 As science and technology of space exploration expand, the law
must continue to change to keep pace and meet new and growing
needs. 3 Space exploration and development are evolving at such a rapid
pace that existing laws are inadequate to address emerging legal issues.'
Although the Space Treaty is still the foundation of international space
law,4" the evolution and change of humankind's status in space must be
addressed with an evolving law. 6
Other underlying purposes for the formation of the Moon Treaty were:
to legally define what constitutes "Outer Space"; 47 to designate the legal
37. Comm. Print, supra note 10, at 9-43.
38. Paper, Review of Recent Discussions Relating to Aspects of Article I of The Outer
Space Treaty, 32 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE PROC. 9 (1989).
39. Id. at 11. By using broad language in their proposals, developing nations and
those without space-flight capabilities were able to win acceptance for the basic idea that
all nations have a claim to space and the celestial bodies. After the idea's adoption, those
nations claimed that the idea extended to natural resources of the celestial bodies no
matter where they were or who aquired them.
40. Unispace '82, A CONTEXT FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND COMPETI-
TION, A TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 26 (1983).
41. Paper, Transition of Confusion in the Law of Outer Space, INTERNATIONAL
SPACE POLICY, 157, 164 (1985).
42. Developing states perceived a need for a formal legal system to handle the legal
issues and questions generated by space exploration. Comm. Print, supra note 10, at vu.
43. See G. ZHUKOV & Y. KoLosov, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, at xii-xiv (1984).
44. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
45. See infra Part III; see also G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE
LAW, at xiv (1984).
46. G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW, 1-10 (1984).
47. Cf G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 17, at 11-12 (1989).
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status of Earth's synchronous geostationary orbit (GEO);48 and to pro-
vide a foundation for specific guidance in space station construction and
space colonization.49
II. THE MOON TREATY: NEW TERRITORY OR SETTLED GROUND?
Although many countries are now entering into and relying on bilat-
eral agreements on space activities,5" international efforts necessarily
continued in an attempt to effect global control over space exploration.5"
In accordance with this aim, COPUOS developed and implemented its
fifth major agreement, the Moon Treaty.52 Although a large scale inter-
national effort, this latest accord falls short of achieving a major legal
advancement in international space law because many of the Moon
Treaty's provisions simply restate themes from older international trea-
ties.53 Further, where the Moon Treaty does attempt to expand on the
themes of the Outer Space Treaty, many of its phrases lack meaningful
and unequivocal definitions.54 Some commentators even suggest that the
Moon Treaty was superfluous and therefore unnecessary.55 However,
others believe the Moon Treaty is very significant and that its benchmark
proviso, "Common Heritage of Mankind," makes it the most significant
treaty to date. 56 Although the Moon Treaty does not precisely define
this phrase, it attempts to provide for the interests of non-space powers in
the eventual benefits reaped from space and celestial body exploration,
excavation, and even eventual colonization.5
7
48. See generally 20 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE PROC. (1978)
(Collection of notes and papers which chronicle the efforts of several non-space equatorial
states to have the synchronous geostationary orbits which exist in the plane above their
respective states as a natural part of those states' domains, and thus not part of the outer
space environment).
49. Gorove, Legal Ties Of A Space Community To Earth, 20 COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE PROC. 241, 243 (1978).
50. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 2, at 185.
51. See generally 1 SPACE LAW: BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS (K. Bocksteigel & M.
Benko ed. 1990) (a chronicled collection of the foremost international accords on space
law).
52. Finch & Moore, The 1979 Moon Treaty Encourages Space Development, 23 COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE PROC. 13 (1981).
53. Note, Space Law - Agreement Governing The Activities of States on The Moon, 21
HARV. INT'L. L.J. 579, 584 (1980). This is especially true of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty. The Moon Treaty tracks the Space Treaty almost entirely, with very little actual
change in content.
54. No legend provides specific meanings for pivotal phrases such as "province of all
mankind," "equitable sharing of benefits from exploitation," "celestial bodies," "interna-
tional regime," and "common heritage of mankind." Galloway, Issues in Implementing
the Agreement Governing Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 23
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE PROC. 19 (1981).
55. Wolcott, Reaching For The Moon, 23 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE PROC. 87 (1981).
56. Cheng, supra note 29 at 220.
57. C. OKOLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING AND
OUTER SPACE 46 (1989).
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The Moon Treaty introduces some significant themes within its tenets
even though it has not yet been, and. may never be, signed by enough
States for those objectives to reach fruition. For example, the Moon
Treaty introduces the idea of protecting the Moon's natural environment
by requiring that exploring parties consider the repercussions of their
activities in space, and the environmental changes that might follow.
This also is the first space law treaty to specifically mandate that space
parties consider the interests of present and future generations, and to
identify a general need to promote higher standards of living. The Moon
Treaty even requires space parties to advise the U.N. Secretary-General
of any radioactive materials deposited on the Moon and the purpose for
such deposits, when feasible.5" The question is whether these items are
significant enough, however, to justify ratification of this treaty as the
newest space law document, especially in light of the extensive redun-
dancy of past treaties.59
The Moon Treaty consists of twenty-one articles. A comparison of
major articles and provisions of both the Moon Treaty and the Space
Treaty reveals the following: 60
58. See generally Cheng, supra note 29, at 213.
59. Note, Space Law - Agreement Governing The Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, 21 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 579, 582 (1980).
60. Analysis of other articles determined the following: Article 2, while it does high-
light some specific agreements, basically calls for international law to govern in space.
The Space Treaty also calls for international law to govern in space. Article 4 requires
observation of the mandate to give "due regard to ... present and future generations"
and to "promote higher standards of living conditions. . .," but the main thrust of article
4 is notice of the theory "province of all mankind." The theory "province of all man-
kind" is also set out in the Space Treaty. Article 5 requires that countries inform the
U.N. Secretary-General of their space activities and of any potentially harmful space
phenomena. Article 5 also sets forth a requirement that countries going into space in the
same time period advise each other of their prospective locations. Except for the last
proviso, the Space Treaty also promulgates the substance of article 5. Article 6 provides
for the "freedom of scientific investigation," and determines that countries can collect
and keep, use, or disburse samples from the Moon. It also suggests scientific manpower
swapping among countries for observation purposes. Article 8 gives countries specific
logistical permission, including allowing excavation on or below the Moon, to place and
launch personnel and equipment, etc. on and from the Moon, and prohibits interference
with another country's Moon activities. The Space Treaty does not mention specific ex-
cavation allowances, but does cover in substance the balance of article 8 in its own article
VIII through XII. Article 9 permits countries to erect space stations on the Moon, and
requires such parties to keep the U.N. Secretary-General advised and aware of the status
of such a station. Article 9 also requires that free access to all areas of the Moon by other
countries not be impeded. Article 12 provides that countries retain jurisdiction and own-
ership over all equipment on the Moon, that "found" equipment is governed by the 1968
Rescue and Return of Astronauts Agreement, and that countries' members may use the
facilities and equipment of another country in an emergency situation, however, prompt
notification to the U.N. is required. Article V of the Space Treaty requires that "[a]ll
possible assistance" be given to an astronaut of another country, while article VIII of the
same treaty provides that countries retain jurisdiction over their possessions and person-
nel in space or on celestial bodies. Article 13 requires a country with knowledge to report
any crash or forced landing to the Secretary-General of the U.N. Article 14 assigns lia-
bility to countries for both the country and its citizens' activities on the Moon. This
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Article 1 applies the Moon Treaty to all celestial bodies within
this solar system (excluding Earth).6' The Space Treaty also provides for
this, as most of its aqicles specifically refer to outer space, the Moon, and
the other celestial bodies.62
Article 3 bans specific types of weapons from space and calls for
only peaceful utilization of the Moon.6 3 The Space Treaty calls for
peaceful purpose and use of the Moon as well as other celestial bodies."
Article 7 prohibits disruption of the existing balance of the envi-
ronment, and mandates taking precautions against same, requiring the
parties to inform the U.N. Secretary-General of what precautions were
taken prior to engaging in space activity. Article 7 further requires par-
ties to notify the U.N. Secretary-General when they introduce any radio-
active materials into space, and to advise other State Parties and the
U.N. Secretary-General of any area of the Moon which has "special sci-
entific interest."65 Excepting the last proviso, the Space Treaty provides
for the entire substance of article 7 in its own article IX.66
Article 10 requires that State Parties regard all persons they come
into contact with on the Moon as spacecraft personnel, following the pro-
visions of the Agreement on The Rescue of Astronauts, The Return of
Astronauts and The Return of Objects Launched into Space. This article
also requires State Parties to offer food and shelter to those in distress.67
Article 10 is covered under the Space Treaty and the 1968 Rescue and
Return of Astronauts Agreement.68
Article 11 provides that the Moon and its natural resources are
the "Common Heritage of Man," which cannot be appropriated or
article also provides notice of the possible need to amend this article in the future. The
1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects dis-
cusses completely the substance of this article. Article 15 declares that the properties of
one country on the Moon are open to inspection by other countries, within certain pa-
rameters and provides specifications for a forum for grievances arising from the provi-
sions of this article. The substance of this provision can be found in articles IX and XII
of the Space Treaty. Article 16 makes this entire treaty applicable to any international
agency, providing such agency agrees to be bound. The provisions of this article are
contained in entirety within article XIII of the Space Treaty. Article 17 provides for any
countries who are members of this agreement to suggest amendments and guidelines.
Article XV of the Space Treaty also allows member countries to propose amendments.
Article 18 provides parameters for review of this agreement by the UNCOPUOS. Article
19 covers the ratification procedures to enact this agreement. Article 20 provides the
policy and guidelines for a member's withdrawal. Article 21 prescribes the method to be
used in the storage and keeping of this treaty.
61. See the Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. I, subdivision 1.
62. See Generally, the Space Treaty, supra note 7.
63. See the Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. III.
64. See the Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IV, para. 2.
65. See the Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. VII.
66. See the Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. IX.
67. See the Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. X.
68. See the Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. V, para. 2; the Agreement on the Rescue
of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer
Space, supra note 8.
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owned, and also that all State Parties have exploration rights on the
Moon. The article requires the State Parties to establish an "interna-
tional regime" to govern space activities, and sets forth policy and guide-
lines for that regime.69 While it does not use the term "Common
Heritage," article I of the Space Treaty does require that exploration of
space, the Moon, and other celestial bodies be "for the benefit of all coun-
tries," and that they are "the province of all mankind." Further, article
II of the Space Treaty states that "Outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation.., by any
* . .means."
70
III. EFFECT ON EXISTING SPACE LAW
A. Fresh and Valuable Aims
Despite its shortcomings, the Moon Treaty prescribes some valuable
and previously unaddressed objectives. The requirement of signatories to
the treaty to consider the possible repercussions of their actions in space
and their effect both on the present and future generations' quality of life
is a significant new objective.7I Absent such a responsibility, a nation-
state or intergovernmental group might engage unchecked in reckless de-
pletion of valuable resources either on Earth,72 or someday, of other ce-
lestial bodies. Similarly, the provision charging the signatories with a
duty to prevent forward and reverse contamination 7 during space explo-
ration and travel is also necessary and commendable, 74 and previously
unmentioned. The proposal of an "international regime" to "govern the
exploration of natural resources of the Moon" will be essential in some
form or another when earnest space exploration and Moon excavation
begin.7" Even now, in the mere preparation stages, negotiations for man-
agement and administration responsibilities over a proposed future inter-
governmental space project have been difficult because of conflicts over
the roles to be played. 76 As previously noted, many of the negotiating
69. See the Moon Treaty, supra note 9, art. XI.
70. See the Space Treaty, supra note 7, arts. I & II.
71. See the Moon Treaty, art. 4 para. 1. In fact, none of the four other major agree-
ments make reference to this point, although the accord on liability addresses present
damages.
72. The Moon Treaty does not directly address space travel-related activities on
Earth. However, space traveling states are required to consider the possible repercus-
sions of activities related to their space travel without specifically stating that the area to
be protected is space and/or the celestial bodies.
73. Forward contamination refers to the possibility of explorers bringing contami-
nants to the new environment. Conversely, reverse contamination refers to explorers car-
rying contaminants from the new environment to their home environment.
74. Moon Treaty, supra note 9, at art. 7, para. 1.
75. Id. at art. 11, paras. 5,6, and 7. Effective regulation of this mining will require fair
and impartial treament. This will most likely require administration by a large and di-
verse group of representatives from the governments of the various state parties.
76. N. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW, 186 (1988). One concern is how the
facility and benefits will be shared by the parties involved. Another concern is whose law
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parties within COPUOS recognize the theme of "Common Heritage of
Mankind" as morally and equitably appropriate. These provisos of the
Moon Treaty represent, without question, some of the matters which
need to be addressed as progress continues and the existing space law
foundations are expanded and improved.
B. Drawbacks
The major drawback of the Moon Treaty is that the document is
mostly a compilation of dictates from the past agreements." The only
truly new proposals of law set forth in this document are those discussed
above. Only six of the twenty-one articles of the Moon Treaty contain
provisions which a previous space law accord does not effectively ad-
dress.7 In addition to the dearth of new ideas, the areas that are novel
lack the clarity necessary to make an effective difference, and would
probably be settled during the normal course of space exploration.79
Many commentators believe that COPUOS could have adopted the few
important new ideas in the Moon Treaty as amendments to the Space
Treaty. s0 This is significant because, as presently constructed, it is very
unlikely that the Moon Treaty will ever be signed by enough parties to
make it effective space law. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the
United States or the Soviet Union will become signatories in any event.
Thus, those new, laudable proposals introduced in the Moon Treaty will
most likely not take effect. If those ideas were proposed as amendments
will govern on the space station and modules. These are points that must be settled
before the proposed space station is completed.
77. See supra note 29. This fact, combined with the current opposition to the "Com-
mon Heritage" theme, represents the most objectionable aspects of the Moon Treaty. If
it were an entirely new legal doctrine, the Treaty might have garnered the support needed
to be signed by the requisite number of States to become effective.
78. See generally note 60.
79. Those areas are: 1. The differences in article 4 as discussed above. 2. Article 5,
para. 2 - requires countries going into space simultaneously to advise one another of their
perspective locations in space. Even without this mandate, space powers aware of one
another's convergent plans would most likely communicate their respective intentions.
Even if they did not, space flights would probably be tracked by other countries with
space flight capability. 3. Article 6 allows exploring countries to administer collected
samples however they see fit. In the absence of this treaty, prior space law would not
preclude such actions. This article also suggests exchanging personnel for scientific ob-
servation. Previous space law requires facilities be open to inspection by other countries.
4. Article 7 requires countries to advise the U.N. Secretary-General of any areas of "spe-
cial scientific interest" on the Moon. Since it is clear that any type of appropriation
would be disallowed, all areas of the Moon and other celetial bodies are open for all to
survey. 5. Article 8 specifically gives permission to excavate on or below the surface of
the Moon. Existing space law would not preclude this in the absence of the Moon
Treaty. 6. Article 9 gives countries express permission to erect edifices on the Moon, and
requires keeping the U.N. advised of their status. Countries are also prohibited from
impeding free access to any part of the Moon from any other countries. Again, erecting
space stations would not be prohibited by the existing space accords and the non-appro-
priation doctrine would preclude any country from interfering with another country's
access to any part of the Moon.
80. See the Moon Treaty, supra note 9, Article xv.
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to the Space Treaty, however, they would be unbridled by the "Common
Heritage" doctrine. The ideas would then have a very good chance of
being adopted into the existing space law. This is an unlikely scenario,
however, as such action would mean relinquishing the "Common Heri-
tage" claim, at least for now. That seems to be a concession non-space
parties will not make.
CONCLUSION
The first universal convention establishing rules applicable to outer
space was the Space Treaty of 1967.81 Until that time, no international
space law existed to avert space conflicts, or to guide nations embarking
on space travel capability. 2 Of even more significance is the effectiveness
quotient of the Space Treaty; it was borne of a rapidly growing need,
filling a developing vacuum in the law. While general principles of inter-
national law existed, they could not and would not have equalled the task
of regulating the journey into space. 3 In this respect, the Space Treaty
brought a new kind of law into existence; the kind capable of guiding
activities in this new and different frontier. However, due to rapidly ad-
vancing technology and other factors, one agreement, or even several,
will not be durable and malleable enough to always meet the problems
which accompany this development, 4 hence the creation of the Moon
Treaty.
As discussed above, the real motivation behind the treaty was the ob-
jective of third world and non-space powers to reserve for themselves a
share of resource wealth secured through future space exploration. 5
However, even if the absence of the "Common Heritage" idea was a fault
in the existing space law, the Moon Treaty will not necessarily rectify the
problem. In hindsight, the inclusion of the "Common Heritage" idea,
although not adequately defined in the treaty, is what will most probably
doom the treaty.8 6
Further, this document does not adequately address those areas which
most need clarification: establishing a legal order in space, defining
"outer space" and the regulation of GEO, and setting up guidelines for
space colonization.8 7 Overall, the Moon Treaty lacks legal precision be-
cause its key terms are never defined and are left open to the interpreta-
tions of the individual signatories s.8  The proposition that the Moon
Treaty "clarifies other existing agreements ... with regard to the explo-
81. E. VAN BOGAERT, ASPECTS OF SPACE LAW, 25 (1986).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 26.
84. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 17, at 44-45.
85. See supra notes 25-47, and accompanying text. The first representative to suggest
borrowing the phrase "Common Heritage of Mankind" from the Law of The Sea Treaty
and applying it to space law was a non-space power member.
86. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 17, at 116.
87. See supra notes 41-47, and accompanying text.
88. Id.
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ration and exploitation of outer space.. .,s9 is not valid. If anything, the
Moon Treaty is more confusing than any of the former accords. 9 It is
not surprising that many in the space law field are of the opinion that the
Space Treaty of 1967 still "enjoys the broadest subscription and the high-
est regard." 91 The Space Treaty still stands as the foundation and opera-
tive law of space exploration.
One of the specifically stated objectives discussed above has been ad-
dressed adequately; the promotion of exchange of scientific results could
be earnestly effected following the article 6 proviso requiring considera-
tion by State Parties of the exchange of personnel for scientific investiga-
tion purposes. However, this treaty does not enhance opportunities and
conditions for the evaluation, research, and exploration of the natural
resources of celestial bodies. Further, it does nothing more to assure ex-
clusively peaceful use of celestial bodies than the Space Treaty of 1967
had already done. The great irony of the Moon Treaty is that the actual
reason for its creation, to implement the theory of "Common Heritage of
Mankind," is the very barrier to its ratification by the great space powers.
For the space arena to develop, a body of law must support its
growth.92 Most impressive about the Outer Space Treaty may be the
absence of mandates harmful to space law development.93 We are still in
the very early stages of extra-terrestrial exploration, and it will still be a
number of years before the people of Earth are able to utilize the re-
sources of celestial bodies. The current state of the Moon Treaty offers
no substantial cures to the long-term areas of concern in space
exploration.
However, the future promises to present new challenges. The United
States is proposing the construction of a space station in the 1990's94
under a near-equal partnership among a number of space powers.95
Eventual development of space communities is inevitable.96 A forward-
reaching international body of law must be in place and capable of meet-
ing the complex problems that colonization will present. When this time
comes, the world's nations should meet the need for a new, substantial
space accord with a legitimate space challenge panacea, not a document
offering a "shadowy legitimacy in law." 97
James R. Wilson
89. C. OKOLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SATELLITE REMOTE SENSING AND
OUTER SPACE, 49 (1989).
90. Comm. Print, supra note 10, at 78-79 (1979).
91. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 17, at 62.
92. Id. at xvi.
93. Id. at 49.
94. N. GOLDMAN, supra note 2, at 186.
95. Id.
96. G. REYNOLDS & R. MERGES, supra note 17, at 307 (excerpt from a 1987 address
by Justice William J. Brennan Jr. to the American Law Institute).
97. Cheng, supra note 29, at 213.
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APPENDIX
Treaty Governing the Activities of States
on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies(The Moon Treaty) 1979
Article I
1. The provisions of this Agreement relating to the moon shall also apply to
other celestial bodies within the solar system, other than the earth, except insofar
as specific legal norms enter into force with respect to any of these celestial
bodies.
2. For the purposes of this Agreement reference to the moon shall include orbits
around or other trajectories to or around it.
3. This Agreement does not apply to extraterrestrial materials which reach the
surface of the earth by natural means.
Article I!
All activities on the moon, including its exploration and use, shall be carried out
in accordance with international law, in particular, the Charter of the United
Nations, and taking into account the Declaration of Principles of International
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accord-
ance with the Charter of the United Nations, adopted by the General Assembly
on 24 October 1979, in the interests of maintaining international peace and
security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding,
and with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties.
Article III
i. The moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful pur-
poses.
2. Any threat or use of force or any other hostile act or threat of hostile act on
the moon is prohibited. It is likewise prohibited to use the moon in order to
commit any such act or to engage in any such threat in relation to the earth, the
moon, spacecraft, the personnel of spacecraft or man-made space objects.
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3. States Parties shall not place in orbit around or other trajectory to or around
the moon objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction or place or use such weapons on or in the moon.
4. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the test-
ing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on the moon
shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for
any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment
or facility necessary for peaceful exploration and use of the moon shall also not
be prohibited.
Article IV
1. The exploration and use of the moon shall be the province of all mankind and
shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespec-
tive of their degree of economic or scientific development. Due regard shall be
paid to the interests of present and future generations as well as to the need to
promote higher standards of living and conditions of economic and social prog-
ress and development in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
2. States Parties shall be guided by the principle of co-operation and mutual
assistance in all their activities concerning the exploration and use of the moon.
International co-operation in pursuance of this Agreement should be as wide as
possible and may take place on a multilateral basis, on a bilateral basis or
through international intergovernmental organizations.
Article V
1. State Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well
as the public and the international scientific community, to the greatest extent
feasible and practicable, of their activities concerned with the exploration and
use of the moon, information on the time, purposes, locations, orbital parame-
ters and duration shall be given in respect of each mission to the moon as soon as
possible after launching, while information on the results of each mission, in-
cluding scientific results, shall be furnished upon completion of the mission. In
the case of a mission lasting more than 60 days, information on conduct of the
mission, including any scientific results, shall be given periodically at 30 days'
intervals. For missions lasting more than six months, only significant additions
to such information need be reported thereafter.
2. If a State Party becomes aware that another State Party plans to operate
simultaneously in the same area of or in the same orbit around or trajectory to or
around the moon, it shall promptly inform the other state of the timing of and
plans for its own operations.
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3. In carrying out activities under this Agreement, States Parties shall promptly
inform the Secretary-General, as well as the public and the international scien-
tific community, of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the
moon, which could endanger human life or health, as well as of any indication
of organic life.
Article VI
I. There shall be freedom of scientific investigation on the moon by all States
Parties without discrimination of any kind, on the basis of equality and in
accordance with international law.
2. In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the provisions
of this Agreement, the States Parties shall have the right to collect on and
remove from the moon samples of its mineral and other substances. Such sam-
ples shall remain at the disposal of those States Parties which caused them to be
collected and may be used by them for scientific purposes. States Parties shall
have regard to the desirability of making a portion of such samples available to
other interested States Parties and the international scientific community for
scientific investigation. States Parties may in the course of scientific investiga-
tions also use mineral and other substances of the moon in quantities appropri-
ate for the support of their missions.
3. States Parties agree on the desirability of exchanging scientific and other
personnel on expeditions to or installations on the moon to the greatest extent
feasible and practicable.
Article VII
1. In exploring and using the moon, States Parties shall take measures to pre-
vent the disruption of the existing balance of its environment whether by intro-
ducing adverse changes in that environment, by its harmful contamination
through the introduction of extraenvironmental matter or otherwise. States Par-
ties shall also take measures to avoid harmfully affecting the environment of the
earth through the introduction of extraterrestrial matter or otherwise.
2. States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
measures being adopted by them in accordance with paragraph I of this article
and shall also, to the maximum extent feasible, notify him in advance of all
placements by them of radioactive materials on the moon and of the purposes of
such placements.
3. States Parties shall report to other States Parties and to the Secretary-General
concerning areas of the moon having special scientific interest in order that,
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without prejudice to the rights of other States Parties, consideration may be
given to the designation of such areas as international scientific preserves for
which special protective arrangements are to be agreed upon in consultation with
the competent bodies of the United Nations.
Article VIII
1. States Parties may pursue their activities in the exploration and use of the
moon anywhere on or below its surface, subject to the provisions of this Agree-
ment.
2. For these purposes States Parties may, in particular:
(a) Land their space objects on the moon and launch them from the moon;
(b) Place their personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and
installations anywhere on or below the surface of the moon.
Personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations may
move or be moved freely over or below the surface of the moon.
3. Activities of States Parties in accordance with paragraphs I and 2 of this
article shall not interfere with the activities of other States Parties on the moon.
Where such interference may occur, the States Parties concerned shall undertake
consultations in accordance with article XV, paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Agree-
ment.
Article IX
1. States Parties may establish manned and unmanned stations on the moon. A
State Party establishing a station shall use only that area which is reasonable for
the needs of the station and shall immediately inform the Secretary-General of
the United Nations of the location and purposes of that station. Subsequently, at
annual intervals that State shall likewise inform the Secretary-General whether
the station continues in use and whether its purposes have changed.
2. Stations shall be installed in such a manner that they do not impede the free
access to all areas of the moon by personnel, vehicles and equipment of other
States Parties conducting activities on the moon in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Agreement or of article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
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Article X
I. States Parties shall adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the life and
health of persons on the moon. For this purpose they shall regard any person on
the moon as an astronaut within the meaning of article V of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and as part of the person-
nel of a spacecraft within the meaning of the Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into
Outer Space.
2. States Parties shall offer shelter in their stations, installations, vehicles and
other facilities to persons in distress on the moon.
Article X!
1. The moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind,
which finds its expression in the provisions of this Agreement and in particular
in paragraph 5 of this article.
2. The moon is not subject to national appropriation by any claim of sov-
ereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.
3. Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or
natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or
non-governmental entity or of any natural person. The placement of personnel,
space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations on or below the
surface of the moon, including structures connected with its surface or sub-
surface, shall not create a right of ownership over the surface or the subsurface
of the moon or any areas thereof. The foregoing provisions are without preju-
dice to the international regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article.
4. States Parties have the right to exploration and use of the moon without
discrimination of any kind on a basis of equality, and in accordance with interna-
tional law and the terms of this Agreement.
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an interna-
tional regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of
the natural resources of the moon as such exploitation is about to become feasi-
ble. This provision shall be implemented in accordance with article XVIII of this
Agreement.
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6. In order to facilitate the establishment of the international regime referred to
in paragraph 5 of this article, States Parties shall inform the Secretary-General
of the United Nations as well as the public and the international scientific com-
munity, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of any natural resources
they may discover on the moon.
7. The main purposes of the international regime to be established shall include:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived from
those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries,
as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly
or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given special consider-
ation.
8. All the activities with respect to the natural resources of the moon shall be
carried out in a manner compatible with the purposes specified in paragraph 7 of
this article and the provisions of article VI, paragraph 2, of this Agreement.
Article XII
I. States Parties shall retain jurisdiction and control over their personnel, vehi-
cles, equipment, facilities, stations and installation on the moon. The ownership
of space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and installations shall not be
affected by their presence on the moon.
2. Vehicles, installations and equipment or their component parts found in
places other than their intended location shall be dealt with in accordance with
article V of the Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts
and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space.
3. In the event of an emergency involving a threat to human life, States Parties
may use the equipment, vehicles, installations, facilities or supplies of other
States Parties on the moon. Prompt notification of such use shall be made to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations or the State Party concerned.
Article XIII
A State Party which learns of the crash landing, forced landing or other unin-
tended landing on the moon of a space object, or its component parts, that were
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not launched by it, shall promptly inform the launching State Party and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article XIV
I. States Parties to this Agreement shall bear international responsibility for
national activities on the moon, whether such activities are carried on by govern-
mental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national
activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in this
Agreement. States Parties shall ensure that non-governmental entities under
their jurisdiction shall engage in activities on the moon only under the authority
and continuing supervision of the appropriate State Party.
2. States Parties recognize that detailed arrangements concerning liability for
damage caused on the moon, in addition to the provisions of the Treaty on
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies and the Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, may become nec-
essary as a result of more extensive activities on the moon. Any such arrange-
ments shall be elaborated in accordance with the procedure provided for in
article XVIII of this Agreement.
Article XV
i. Each State Party may assure itself that the activities of other States Parties in
the exploration and use of the moon are compatible with the provisions of this
Agreement. To this end, all space vehicles, equipment, facilities, stations and
installations on the moon shall be open to other States Parties. Such States
Parties shall give reasonable advance notice of a projected visit, in order that
appropriate consultations may be held and that maximum precautions may be
taken to assure safety and to avoid interference with normal operations in the
facility to be visited. In pursuance of this article, any State Party may act on its
own behalf or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party or
through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the
United Nations and in accordance with the Charter.
2. A State Party which has reason to believe that another State Party is not
fulfilling the obligations incumbent upon it pursuant to this Agreement or that
another State Party is interfering with the rights which the former State has
under this Agreement may request consultations with that Party. A State Party
receiving such a request shall enter into such consultations without delay. Any
other State Party which requests to do so shall be entitled to take part in the
consultations. Each State Party participating in such consultations shall seek a
mutually acceptable resolution of any controversy and shall bear in mind the
rights and interests of all States Parties. The Secretary-General of the United
1991]
12 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORT [Vol.11
Nations shall be informed of the results of the consultations and shall transmit
the information received to all States Parties concerned.
3. If the consultations do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement which has
due regard for the rights and interests of all States Parties, the parties concerned
shall take all measures to settle the dispute by other peaceful means of their
choice and appropriate to the circumstances and the nature of the dispute. If
difficulties arise in connection with the opening of consultations or if consulta-
tions do not lead to a mutually acceptable settlement, any State Party may seek
the assistance of the Secretary-General, without seeking the consent of any other
State Party concerned, in order to resolve the controversy. A State Party which
does not maintain diplomatic relations with another State Party concerned shall
participate in such consultations at its choice, either itself or through another
State Party or the Secretary-General as intermediary.
Article XVI
With the exception of articles XVII to XXI, references to this Agreement to
States shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental organiza-
tion which conducts space activities if the organization declares its acceptance of
the rights and obligations provided for in this Agreement, and if a majority of
the States members of the organization are States Parties to this Agreement and
to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. States
members of any such organization which are States Parties to this Agreement
shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organization makes a declara-
tion in accordance with the foregoing.
Article XVII
Any State Party to this Agreement may propose amendments to the Agreement.
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Agreement accept-
ing the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to
the Agreement and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Agreement
on the date of acceptance by it.
Article XVIII
Ten years after the entry into force of this Agreement, the question of the review
of the Agreement shall be included in the provisional agenda of the General
Assembly of the United Nations in order to consider, in the light of past applica-
tion of the Agreement, whether it requires revision. However, at any time after
the Agreement has been in force for five years, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, as depository, shall, at the request of one third of the States
REGULATION OF OUTER SPACE
Parties to the Agreement and with the concurrence of the majority of the States
Parties, convene a conference of the States Parties to review this Agreement. A
review conference shall also consider the question of the implementation of the
provisions of article XI, paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle referred to in
paragraph I of that article and taking into account in particular any relevant
technological developments.
Article XIX
i. This Agreement shall be open for signature.by all States at United Nations
Headquarters in New York.
2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Any State
which does not sign this Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. Instruments of ratifica-
tion or accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
3. This Agreement shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date
of deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.
4. For each State depositing its instrument of ratification or accession after the
entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the thirtieth day
following the date of deposit of any such instrument.
5. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification or accession to this Agreement, the date of its entry into force and
other notices.
Article XX
Any State Party to this Agreement may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Agreement one year after its entry into force by written notification to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such withdrawal shall take effect one
year from the date of receipt of this notification.
Article XXI
The original of this Agreement, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof
to all signatory and acceding States.
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